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Legislative Findings, Congressional Powers, and the
Future of the Voting Rights Act
Luis FUENTES-ROHWER*
In enacting the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress sought to overcome decades of
outright refusal to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. The statute was considered
"harsh " and "punitive" by critics, and the Supreme Court partially agreed, calling
the legislation "stringent, " inventive, " and "uncommon. " Yet the Court ultimately
sided with the national ruling coalition as represented by the administration and
overwhelming congressional majorities. This Article examines the early internal
debates over the constitutionality of the Act and concludes that the question of
legislative findings played a key role. In particular, internal notes and memoranda
from the Katzenbach cases reveal that Justice Brennan worried about the Court's use
of legislative findings in upholding congressional enactments. This unease helps
explain the different approaches taken by the Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach
and Katzenbach v. Morgan to the question of congressional powers under the
Reconstruction Amendments. As we look ahead to future constitutional challenges to
the Voting Rights Act and question whether the statute will meet the Court's newfound
demands under its federalism revolution, this Article underscores Justice Brennan's
implicit admonition: in the end, the question of legislative findings will be nothing
more than a smokescreen, as this will be a debate aboutjudicial attitudes and the
Court's long-standing role as an integral member of the national ruling coalition.
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INTRODUCTION
The Voting Rights Act of 19651 ("Act") was a radical proposal, designed to deal
once and for all with a problem that had plagued the nation, and which Congress had
attempted to solve various times before.2 During the Senate hearings on the bill, for
example, Attorney General Katzenbach explained that "[tihere comes a time when the
facts are all in, the alternatives have been tried and found wanting, and time has run
out. We stand at that point today." 3 As he offered to the House Committee, these
previous attempts had relied on good faith enforcement of its provisions, whereas the
new bill no longer did so, as "we are not going to be frustrated again by the long and
tedious delays and resort to law as a delaying device.'
Undoubtedly, the proposed voting rights bill was no longer willing to cede ground
to Southern mores and sensibilities. Under the trigger formula, a jurisdiction came
under the purview of the Act if it employed a literacy test and either its turnout rate for
the 1964 presidential election or its registration rate on November 1, 1964 was fifty
percent or less. Hardly by coincidence, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
South Carolina, Virginia, and twenty-six counties in North Carolina came under the
coverage formula, and were subject to section 5, the so-called preclearance
requirement. In turn, these covered jurisdictions had to submit any proposed changes in
"voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure" to
a judge in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for a determination that
the changes did not have the purpose and would not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. 5
The preclearance requirement garnered much derision. During the 1969 Senate
hearings over the extension of the Act, for example, Senator Ervin complained that the
"North Carolina Legislature should be required to come to Washington to the Attorney
General's office, and bow and scrape and make obeisance before him and say 'Please
allow this act of our legislature to go into effect.' 6 During the House hearings of the
same year, A.F. Summer, Mississippi's Attorney General, similarly argued: "Why keep
1. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973 to
1973bb- 1 (West 2006)).
2. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,313-15 (1966). See, e.g., Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat. 241 (1964); Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449,
74 Stat. 86 (1960); Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957).
3. Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.
8 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Hearings] (testimony of Attorney General Katzenbach); see
South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 313-15.
4. Voting Rights: Hearings on H.R. 6400 and Other Proposals to Enforce the 15th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 oftheH. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 67 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings].
5. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(a) (West 2006).
6. Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 818, S. 2507, and Title
IV of S. 2029 Before the Subcomm. on Const. Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong. 201 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Senate Hearings].
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the heel of your boot on our neck for another five years? When does confidence begin
and suspicion end? ' 7 To his mind, "Mississippi will dry up on the vine if this
continues. We cannot housekeep in our own State with this law on the books.",
8
The critics also challenged the constitutionality of the Act. Yet in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,9 the Court stepped aside and let the politics of the day run their course,
even while conceding that "[t]his may have been an uncommon exercise of
congressional power." 10 To the Court, the approach taken by Congress was demanded
by the harsh realities of our voting rights history. As it explained, "Congress felt itself
confronted by an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain
parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution."' 1
Precisely for this reason, "the unsuccessful remedies which [Congress] had prescribed
in the past would have to be replaced by sterner and more elaborate measures in order
to satisfy the clear commands of the Fifteenth Amendment."'12 Congress offered a
detailed account of this history while debating the Act, and the Court took notice. 13 It is
also clear that the Court considered the tenor of the times and the ongoing civil rights
movement. Of the Justices, only Justice Black was unpersuaded. In dissent, he
complained that this approach "create[s] the impression" that the covered jurisdictions
"are little more than conquered provinces."' 14
But the 1960s have long passed and the present Court is quite different from the
Warren Court. Today's Court is far more solicitous of theories of federalism and
states' rights, far more likely-were it writing on a clean slate-to side with Justice
Black than with Chief Justice Warren on the constitutionality of section 5. Within the
last ten years, for example, the Court has stated that the preclearance requirement
"imposes substantial 'federalism costs,"' 1 5 which have led the Court to interpret the Act
in ways that do not "increase further" these "serious" costs.' 6 In the meantime, the
Court has unveiled its federalism revolution, 17 with City ofBoerne 8 and Garrett'9 as
7. Id. at 369; see Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearings on H.R. 4249 and H.R. 5538
Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91 st Cong. 129 (1969) [hereinafter
1969 House Hearings].
8. 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 381; see also 1969 House Hearings, supra note
7, at 130 ("If this act is continued, section 5, as interpreted by the Court, would prevent even
regular housekeeping by the State.").
9. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
10. Id. at 334.
11. Id. at 309.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 309-15.
14. Id. at 360 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
15. Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266,282 (1999) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 926 (1995)); see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 201 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that "encroachment is especially troubling because it destroys
local control of the means of self-government"); United States v. Bd. ofComm'rs, 435 U.S. 110,
141 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that the Act's encroachment on state
sovereignty is "significant and undeniable").
16. Reno v. Bossier Parrish, 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997).
17. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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leading exemplars of this recent move to curtail congressional authority under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Given these cases, the recent extension and amendments to the Voting Rights Act-
named the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 -will force the Court to face up to its
past, to its tradition, and the force of its precedent. This is an intriguing story, pitting
judicial doctrine in an inevitable collision against the Act in times of marked
constitutional change. Taken to its logical conclusion, this argument places the Court in
direct conflict with what I call "the House that Warren Built," long-standing precedents
from the 1960s that until some ye.rs ago seemed safe as a central part of our
constitutional tradition. Moreover, the Voting Rights Act is hardly a run-of-the-mill
statute, but the most important and effective civil rights legislation in history. And so,
the legal challenge to the renewed Voting Rights Act will appear to offer a "perfect
storm" of sorts: a case where the Court must sort out its affinities for states' rights and
the right to vote as measured against its distrust of racial categories and excessive
congressional power. This important area is thus positioned as a showdown for the
ages, a clash of principles between 1960s liberalism and 1990s conservatism. This may
well be the true test of the federalism revolution of recent years.
On these terms, the inevitable constitutional challenge to the Voting Rights Act will
be a straightforward question of doctrine and our ability to predict the future. 21 To
focus on this question, however, would miss the central import of the Court's handling
of the Act and its connection to both the federalism revolution and the political
question doctrine more generally. This Article looks to this important past and reaches
two related conclusions. On the question ofjudicial posture and the political question
tradition, this Article concludes that the Court has implicitly treated the question of
congressional powers to enact the Voting Rights Act the way it treats political
questions writ large.22 In other words, this has been a question ofjudicial will and the
Court's disinclination to strike down this important statute. This accommodating
approach dates back to the Court's initial foray in this area in the Katzenbach cases and
offers a view of the Court as an important member of the national ruling coalition.23
18. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
19. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
20. Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 578.
21. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177 (2005);
Victor Andres Rodriguez, Comment, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 After Boerne:
The Beginning of the End of Preclearance?, 91 CAL. L. REV. 769 (2003).
22. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reconsidering the Law of Democracy: Of Political
Questions, Prudence, and the Judicial Role, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1899 (2006) [hereinafter
Fuentes-Rohwer, Reconsidering].
23. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957), reprinted in 50 EMORY L.J. 563 (2001);
Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. S¢!. REv. 795, 796
(1975). See also GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT &
MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1993); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties Revolution, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 16 n.72 (1996) ("[T]he Court strays




On the question of the Act's constitutional standing in light of the federalism
revolution, this Article also traces this question back to the early case law. The
question under the federalism cases is whether Congress has developed an adequate
factual record in support of the legislation under review. This is not a new concern. In
his handwritten response to Chief Justice Warren's original draft of the South Carolina
v. Katzenbach opinion, Justice Brennan worried that such a demand for findings was
unnecessary and ultimately dangerous. While a reviewing Court could always agree
that the proffered legislative findings meet with its approval, a future Court need not be
so agreeable. To Justice Brennan, as his Katzenbach v. Morgan opinion amply
displayed, findings should play no role in this inquiry at all.
Part I examines South Carolina v. Katzenbach24 and Katzenbach v. Morgan25 in
order to understand and contextualize the Court's approach to the Act. This Part
analyzes the drafting of these opinions and their evolution from early drafts to
publication. Two conclusions are worth noting. First, it is remarkable that the opinions
in South Carolina and Morgan were a scant three months apart yet took different
approaches to the questions presented. At the heart of their differences stood the issue
of legislative findings, with Justice Brennan displaying an uncanny ability to predict
the future and what the Court may do if disinclined to uphold a congressional
enactment.
Second, this Part disagrees with the view that the Court was turning away from
South Carolina in Morgan. Rather, the different approaches to the question of
legislative findings may be attributed to authorship and the perceived demands of the
questions presented. In South Carolina, Chief Justice Warren had to contend with the
constitutionality of the Act as a question of congressional powers, while in Morgan,
Justice Brennan needed to focus instead on whether Congress would appear to
supersede a prior judicial ruling. In other words, while Chief Justice Warren faced the
South and its collective perceptions about the legislation, Justice Brennan faced the
Court itself.
Part II interprets the Court's handling of the Act as part of a larger claim about the
Court's role as a member of the national ruling coalition. This conclusion applies to the
Katzenbach cases and holds true for subsequent challenges to the constitutionality of
the Act. These are cases where doctrine and legislative materials offer limited counter-
pressure to the difficult constitutional questions raised by the Act.26 This is an argument
for "voting rights exceptionalism" and the Court's disinclination through the years to
strike down one of the most effective and important civil rights statutes in history. Of
note, this argument is consonant with the more limited story of congressional powers
offered by the recent federalism cases. At their core, both stories are about the role
played by the question of legislative findings, first flagged by Justice Brennan in his
notes to the first draft of the South Carolina opinion. More interestingly, this Part
contends that these arguments share a common lineage grounded in the Court's
historical treatment of political questions. In placing legislative findings at the heart of
24. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
25. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
26. Cf Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Public Opinion, Judicial Review, and Shifting Majorities:
The Ironic Case of the Voting Rights Act (Mar. 27, 2006) (unpublished manuscript on file with
the Indiana Law Journal).
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its constitutional inquiry, the Court implicitly turns this inquiry into a question of
judicial attitudes and the Justices own views about the legislation under review.
This Article concludes that the Court will likely follow its familiar script and uphold
the Voting Rights Act against any likely constitutional challenges. But this would
hardly be news. In turning the constitutionality of the Act into a question of prudence
and judicial will, the Court would be applying the clear lessons of the reapportionment
revolution.27
I. REVISITING THE KATZENBACH CASES: LEGISLATIVE
FINDINGS AND RATIONALITY REVIEW
Before enacting the measure, Congress explored with great care the problem of
racial discrimination in voting.
28
It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough
that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the
conflict as it did.29
Looking at the Act and its preclearance provision, it is easy to see how its
constitutionality seemed to hang in the balance. The critics scored many points with
their relentless attacks on the bill. Yet criticism also came from unexpected quarters,
most notably Solicitor General Cox. In a memorandum to the Attorney General, Cox
argued that the formula for determining which jurisdictions were covered under the Act
was simply irrational. To his mind, "[o]ne might equally well make the Act applicable
to any State whose name begins with Vi or Mi or Lo or Al or Ge or So. Indeed," he
continued, "since even this description covers Alaska as well as Alabama, it has
exactly the same effect as the determinations now required to be made."
30
And yet, in retrospect, it is difficult to imagine the Supreme Court striking down this
important piece of legislation. This is not simply a descriptive point about the Warren
Court and its concededly liberal bent on civil rights issues but, rather, a point about the
Court and its role across history.31 The Katzenbach cases 32 fit within this historical
account, as the Court clearly deferred to the policy wishes of substantial congressional
majorities. This Part examines the Katzenbach cases and concludes that South
Carolina v. Katzenbach and Katzenbach v. Morgan took decidedly different
approaches to the question of legislative findings. This Part explores the differences
27. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Domesticating the Gerrymander: An Essay on Standards,
Fair Representation, and the Necessary Question of Judicial Will, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 423 (2005). For an argument that the Court has been acutely conscious of its standing
vis-A-vis Congress throughout its history, see generally CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN
COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM
(2006).
28. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 308.
29. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653.
30. Memorandum from Solicitor General Cox to the Attorney General 1 (Mar. 23, 1965)
(Justice Department Administrative History, Civil Rights, Lyndon B. Johnson Library).
31. See SPANN, supra note 23; Dahl, supra note 23, at 285; Funston, supra note 23, at 796;
Klarman, supra note 23, at 16 n.72.
32. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 641; South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 301.
[Vol. 82:99
FINDINGS
between the cases, and in so doing it grounds the modem debate over the
constitutionality of the Act. This Part concludes that the concern over legislative
findings was never far from the Justices' minds.
A. South Carolina: Facts and Context
South Carolina was undoubtedly a delicate case. Congress was aiming its
considerable power at the Southern states, and in so doing invited references to
Reconstruction and the oppressive use of federal power against recalcitrant states.
33
The Court seemed aware of the delicate nature of the proceedings, ridden as they were
with "emotional overtones." For this reason, the Court took the curious step of
emphasizing early in the opinion that the briefs and the debate during oral argument
were "temperate, lawyerlike, and constructive."3 4 Also, all states were asked to take
part in the proceeding as friends of the Court; many states chose to participate in one
way or another.
35
The case was delicate for a second reason. Under section 5 of the Act, as well as for
bailout purposes, Congress chose to bypass the judicial process in the affected states
and forced the covered jurisdictions to file declaratory judgment actions in the District
Court for the District of Columbia. This was a point of contention throughout the
hearings. In an exchange with Senator Ervin, for example, Attorney General
Katzenbach complained that the Department of Justice had won every case it had ever
brought against discriminating jurisdictions, yet the relief had been unsatisfactory. To
which the Senator replied, "Let's not say anything which will permit anyone to imply
that the southern district and circuit court judges are as bad as the southern election
officials. 36 James Kilpatrick, vice chairman of the Virginia Commission on
Constitutional Government, criticized the provision on similar grounds: "It... has an
entirely unwarranted reflection upon the integrity of U.S. district judges in the South. It
is not deserved and I do not think the Congress ought to be involved in what is an
insult to members of the judiciary., 37
The Justices were well aware of this ticklish procedure and how it would be
understood by southern judges. They knew they needed to address these concerns in
some way. In the original draft of the opinion, Chief Justice Warren defended this
choice of forum the following way:
Congress might appropriately limit litigation under this provision to a single court
in the District of Columbia, as it has done in previous occasions. Designation of a
neutral forum at the nation's capital assured that areas equally eligible for relief
33. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 321 ("I said it was worse than the Thaddeus
Stevens legislation during Reconstruction, sir, and it is. It is the most nefarious-it is
inconceivable that Americans would do that to Americans.") (statement of Judge Leander
Perez).
34. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 308.
35. Id. at 307-08.
36. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 71.
37. Id. at 649.
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would be treated in substantially the same way, a result not otherwise likely in
view of the highly controversial nature of the Act.
38
This argument tracked very closely the reasons given by Congress and the
administration for the provision. 9 Yet this reasoning hardly made the procedure any
more palatable. Justice Brennan expressed these concerns to the Chief Justice three
days after the first draft of the opinion circulated: "My concern was that some of the
judges of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits might feel offended by reference to the
congressional justification for selecting the District of Columbia forum."'4 Instead, "it
is sufficient for our purposes to note the congressional choice was well within its power
to designate courts in the allocation of federal judicial power."'4 1 The Court ultimately
adopted this reasoning, explaining that Congress had adopted similar procedures
before, and "the Act is no less reasonable in this respect.
' 42
Notwithstanding its delicate nature, the case moved forward at a very fast clip.
Recall that President Johnson signed the legislation into law on August 6, 1965. The
Court expedited the case and heard oral arguments a scant five months later, on
January 17 and 18.43 Three weeks later, on February 8, Chief Justice Warren finished
his draft of the opinion, which he circulated two weeks later, on February 23.44 And
within the next ten days, a majority of Justices joined the Chief Justice's opinion, with
the exception of Justice Black, who circulated a dissent on March 4 and recirculated it
on March 6. 45 The Court issued its opinion on March 7. Two features of the debate
demand careful attention. First, how aggressively should the Court examine remedial
congressional enactments pursuant to Congress's Section 5 power? And second, what
are the limits to such power?
1. Supervising the Legislative Process
The question of congressional powers was in many ways a question of process. To
the critics, the proposed legislation had been hastily drafted over a short period of time.
According to Senator Ervin, for example, the proposed legislation was "written in...
38. Chief Justice Warren, Original Draft of South Carolina v. Katzenbach 25 (Feb. 23,
1966) (Warren Papers, Library of Congress, Box 618, folder 2, copy on file with the Indiana
Law Journal) (citations omitted).
39. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 24; 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at
72.
40. Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Chief Justice Warren, Supreme Court, 1 (Feb.
26, 1966) [hereinafter Brennan Memo] (Warren Papers, Library ofCongress, Box 618, folder 2,
copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
41. Id.
42. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 332 (1966).
43. Id. at 301.
44. Chief Justice Warren, Original Draft of South Carolina v. Katzenbach I (Feb. 23, 1966)
(Brennan Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1: 132, folder 6, copy on file with the Indiana Law
Journal); Circulation Sheet for South Carolina v. Katzenbach (Feb. 23, 1966) (Warren Papers,
Library of Congress, Box 618, folder 2, copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
45. See Justice Black, Original Draft of Concurrence and Dissent in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach (Mar. 4, 1966) (Warren Papers, Library of Congress, Box 618, folder 2, copy on file
with the Indiana Law Journal).
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haste, 46 while Senator Rodgers complained that "[t]he bill was rather hazily drawn
and I think it is obvious."47 Consideration of the bill by the Senate would be subject to
similar criticisms. The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee on March
22, with a mandate to report it back to the full Senate no later than April 9. The
committee chairman, James Eastland of Mississippi, remarked that this time limitation
would make it "impossible for the committee to take oral testimony from everyone, or
even a substantial number of those who wished to be heard."48 Senator Ervin similarly
observed that "it is a tragic thing for the Senate to put a time limitation on the
consideration of this bill by the committee."49
Attorney General Katzenbach disagreed with this characterization:
It wasn't written in all that haste. There were a lot of revisions that were made, as I
think is true of almost every law that is enacted, that there are changes made in
committee, changes made up to the last minute. Just because changes are made,
just before the bill is reported, you don't say that the bill was drafted in haste.50
Notably, the Supreme Court also disagreed. This was not legislation borne in haste;
Congress had "explored with great care the problem of racial discrimination in
voting" 5 1 and had documented "in considerable detail" its findings and conclusions
with regards to the problem at hand.
52
To be sure, the question of legislative findings took on a prominent role at the hands
of the Chief Justice. He noted early in the opinion that Congress had debated the
measure in hearings that lasted over nine days, and the debate on the floor of both
chambers had taken approximately twenty-nine days.53 The conclusion was
inescapable: "an insidious and pervasive evil.., had been perpetuated in certain parts
of our country," and earlier attempts to deal with the problem had proven unsuccessful
"and would have to be replaced by sterner and more elaborate measures in order to
satisfy the clear commands of the Fifteenth Amendment." 54 The legislation was clearly
55 56supported by this evidence55 and by overwhelming congressional majorities.
This use of the record was not universally received and raised some eyebrows
within the Court. In a memo to the Chief Justice on February 26, Justice Brennan
joined the Court's opinion and expressed his view that "this is really a fine opinion., 57
46. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 54. Senator Ervin repeated this complaint often.
See id. at 235, 593.
47. Id. at 616.
48. Id. at 4.
49. Id. at 6.
50. Id. at 54.
51. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
52. Id. at 309. See also id. at 329 ("Congress began work with reliable evidence of actual
voting discrimination in a great majority of the States and political subdivisions affected by the
new remedies of the Act.").
53. See id. at 308-09.
54. Id. at 309.
55. See, e.g., id. at 329 (explaining that Congress had "reliable evidence" for implementing
the coverage formula).
56. See id. at 309.
57. Brennan Memo, supra note 40, at 2.
20071
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But his reaction to the first draft of the opinion, written on the margins of his circulated
draft, told a remarkably different story. For example, he complained in response to the
first part of the opinion that "[i]t seems to me one thing to summarize the facts put
before the legislature, and another to do what the Chief seems to be up to in this
[section]-accepting the Congressional findings because they correspond to our
own." 58 Justice Brennan's response to the same paragraph and the Chief Justice's
references to the process that led to the passage of the legislation were similarly
critical: "Do we judge statutes by no. of witnesses[,] length of hearings[,] unanimity of
vote? The Chief is judging the legislative product as if it were a judicial one., 59 His
comment at the close of the first part of the draft encapsulates the heart of his criticism:
"In several places, like this one, the Chief comes close to writing this as if it were an
advisory opinion. I think this might be avoided. Are we reviewing the sections, any
more than we are the adequacy of the hearings?,
60
Justice Brennan's criticisms make sense when placed in doctrinal context.
According to Chief Justice Warren's opinion, the question was whether Congress had
exercised its Section 2 powers under the Fifteenth Amendment "in an appropriate
manner with relation to the States." 6' Put affirmatively, the Court explained that
Congress "may use any rational means" to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.62 This is
a very flexible and forgiving standard, a view that the remaining part of the opinion did
not disappoint. In upholding the Act in its entirety, the Court used a language of
deference while writing about "legitimate responses," "appropriate means," and
"permissible methods."63
The specific provisions of the Act fared similarly. For example, the Court deemed
the coverage formula, the source of great derision by critics of the Act,64 to be "rational
in both practice and theory., 65 Similarly, the temporary suspension of literacy tests was
"a legitimate response to the problem."66 And the preclearance provision, while an
"uncommon exercise of congressional power," was a "permissibly decisive" response
to the problem at hand,67 justified by "exceptional conditions. 68 In fairness, the Court
58. Chief Justice Warren, Original Draft of South Carolina v. Katzenbach 25 (Feb. 23,
1966) (Brennan Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1:132, folder 6, copy on file with the Indiana
Law Journal) (Justice Brennan's handwritten notes on draft) (emphasis in original).
59. Id. at 3 (Justice Brennan's handwritten notes on draft).
60. Id. at 11 (Justice Brennan's handwritten notes on draft).
61. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 324.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 328.
64. According to Representative Reinecke, the formula was "harshly arbitrary," 1965 House
Hearings, supra note 4, at 450, a sentiment that Senator Ervin expressed often. See 1965 Senate
Hearings, supra note 3, at 33 ("I do not think there is necessarily any logical connection
between the assumption based on these percentages and the presumption that there was a
violation of the 14th Amendment."); id. at 272 (criticizing the coverage of the bill and branding
the legislation a "cockeyed bill"); id. at 263 (complaining that the statutory test has no relation
to the discrimination in registration); see also id. at 265 (contending that the triggering test is
arbitrary) (statement of Charles Bloch, Esq., of Macon, GA).
65. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 330.
66. Id. at 334.




conceded that the proposed legislation was "stringent, ' 69 "inventive," 70 and
"uncommon," 71 to be sure, but this was a measure of the problem at hand. Little else
could be expected from a proposal designed to eradicate a problem that "has infected
the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century.,
72
Justice Brennan was reacting to the Chief Justice's recital of legislative findings and
his approval of the legislative process that gave birth to the law. Justice Brennan's
point, far reaching and prescient in light of the doctrinal turn of recent years, was that
the Chief Justice was addressing unnecessary issues. This was not a debate over
legislative due process and whether Congress followed the proper procedures.7
Rather, at issue were the demands of rational basis review. Justice Brennan was
underscoring the fact that under rationality review, explicit congressional findings were
not required. This had been true in the Commerce Clause context since at least 1937,74
and Justice Brennan did not wish for the Court to establish such a requirement under
the Reconstruction Amendments. 75 After all, if the legislation was constitutional
because of the record in support of its passage, different minds could always disagree
about the sufficiency of the available record. Or, put another way, future court
majorities could turn "hostile to ordinary forms of congressional fact finding,
dismissive of the evidence Congress in fact gathered, and quick to demand new,
resource-intensive, and counterproductive forms of inquiry., 76 Ever so presciently,
Justice Brennan wished to avoid this difficulty altogether.
In offering these findings, however, it is clear that Chief Justice Warren had
different concerns. The perception among critics of the legislation was that the Act was
punitive and discriminatory against the Southern states. In the words of Representative
Waggoner, for example: "The bill recognizes no reluctance to discriminate against
these Southern States and make them the whipping boys for the nation. '77 Senator
Ervin similarly argued: "They blow hot and they blow cold, but they are always
blowing at some Southern States, are they not?, 78 And Senator Sparkman complained
69. Id. at 308.
70. Id. at 327.
71. Id. at 334.
72. Id. at 308.
73. See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976).
74. See A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The
Supreme Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Review ofFederal Statutes, 86 CoRNELL
L. REV. 329, 359-63 (2001); William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record
Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87, 106 (2001); Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill:
Congressional Findings, ConstitutionalAdjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 696, 701 (1996).
75. Justice Harlan, for one, so understood the Court's holding in South Carolina. See
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 667 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People:
Juricentric Restrictions on Section 5 Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 16 (2003).
77. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 709; see id. at 643 ("There are so many
constitutional provisions violated in this thing here. It is directed at my part of the world and
Alaska.") (statement of Rep. Rivers).
78. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 298; see id. at 263 ("So the United States of
America would be divided into two groups, the good and the bad, if you please.") (statement of
Charles Bloch, Esq., of Macon, GA).
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that "[i]t is a harsh bill, designed to punish the South. ' 7 9 The Chief Justice was aware
of these criticisms and seemed to go out of his way to assure the country that the
charges were unfounded. While it may have been true that findings were not a
necessary feature of rational basis review as then understood, they were necessary in
this case. According to the Court, Congress developed a detailed record of racial
discrimination and the Act was a clear and legitimate response to these findings.
Without question, the Court offered very little resistance to an aggressive
application of congressional powers. But context made all the difference in the world.
This was the height of the civil rights movement, with the nation caught in the throes of
"nearly a century of widespread resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment." 80 The Court
clearly took notice and offered Congress a way to solve the pressing issues of the day.
81
In the words of Lucas Powe, "The Court was extending an offer to Congress to become
a full partner in the Court's great tasks." 82 This was not the brand of skeptical review
we have seen from recent Rehnquist Court opinions but, rather, an invitation to
Congress to carry on its needed work as demanded by the conscience of the times.
2. Anticipating Morgan
This last point cannot be overstated. In its eagerness to give Congress its blessings,
the original draft of the opinion appeared to open a gaping hole in the doctrinal
canvass. Late in the draft, Chief Justice Warren offered the following: "Accordingly,
Congress has even broader remedial powers than the courts to effectuate the
constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting., 83 Such is the
sentiment of a Court in tune with congressional moods, a Court wishing to invite
Congress to carry out its work with little judicial resistance.
And yet, some Justices could foresee the repercussions of this position. For
example, Justice Brennan wrote in his draft of the opinion, "Are the implications of the
underscored qualifications here [and] above ever examined?" 84 Justice Fortas similarly
wrote in a memo to the Chief Justice, "I wonder if this adds enough to the argument to
offset the possibility that it may be used in unforeseeable ways to support arguments to
narrow court orders."85 In other words, it is one thing to invite Congress to expand
79. Id. at 625.
80. Id. at 337.
81. See Archibald Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights,
80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 107 (1966) ("If the Congress follows the lead that the Court has provided,
the last Term's opinions interpreting [Section] 5 will prove as important in bespeaking national
legislative authority to promote human rights as the Labor Board decisions of 1937 were in
providing national authority to regulate the economy.").
82. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLmCs 265 (2000).
83. Chief Justice Warren, Original Draft of South Carolina v. Katzenbach 20 (Feb. 23,
1966) (Warren Papers, Library of Congress, Box 618, folder 2, copy on file with the Indiana
Law Journal).
84. Chief Justice Warren, Original Draft of South Carolina v. Katzenbach 21 (Feb. 23,
1966) (Brennan Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1: 132, folder 6, copy on file with the Indiana
Law Journal) (Justice Brennan's handwritten notes on draft).
85. Memorandum from Justice Fortas to Chief Justice Warren (Feb. 24, 1966) (Warren
Papers, Library of Congress, Box 618, folder 2, copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
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rights at a time when Congress and the Court could agree on the substance of many
such rights; yet it would be quite another to extend such an invitation when the views
of Congress and the Court are in tension. 6
The Chief Justice heeded these concerns and the language was tightened
considerably in the final draft. Accordingly, "Congress has full remedial powers to
effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting. ' '87 How
"full" these remedial powers were, and how far they would extend in a future case, the
Court did not say. And so the question of whether Congress has "broader remedial
powers than the courts" to enforce rights under the Reconstruction Amendments
remained unanswered, but only for a short time.
B. Morgan: Ratchets and Enforcing Rights
It would take five weeks to answer, to be exact. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court
examined section 4(e) of the Act, whereby a person who had completed a sixth-grade
education in an "American-flag" school where the language of instruction was not
English may not be denied the right to vote on account of failing to pass an English
literacy test.88 This provision appeared to come in direct conflict with Lassiter v.
Northampton Election Board,s9 where the Court upheld the per se constitutionality of
literacy tests. And so the Court faced the question left open in South Carolina: how far
do Congress's remedial powers under the Reconstruction Amendments extend? Or,
"[w]ithout regard to whether the judiciary would find that the Equal Protection Clause
itself nullifies New York's English literacy requirement as so applied, could Congress
prohibit the enforcement of the state law by legislating under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment?"9
In keeping with the tenor of the times and the South Carolina opinion, the Court
answered this question in the affirmative. Yet Morgan went farther than South
Carolina, as it allowed Congress to "enforce" its own political vision of a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment irrespective of the Court's prior holdings on the question.
Morgan's posture was markedly different, due in great measure to arguments made by
Justice Harlan in dissent. One disagreement centered on the need for legislative
findings, another on the appropriate standard of review and the role of the Court in
matters of constitutional interpretation.
86. To Professors Post and Siegel, this argument was a non-starter, since "[t]he Court can
still hold unconstitutional any exercise of Section 5 power that it believes violates a Section 1
right, in the same way that it can hold unconstitutional any exercise of Commerce Clause power
that it believes violates a Section 1 right." Post and Siegel, supra note 76, at 40. And yet, Chief
Justice Warren removed the objecting language from his draft, and the Court then addressed the
point head on in Morgan without advancing Post and Siegel's argument. This suggests that the
Court "was not yet in full command of the implications of its own doctrine." Id.
87. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966).
88. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
89. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
90. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649 (1966).
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1. Rationality and Legislative Findings
The question in Morgan was the classic question of structure: how far do
congressional powers extend under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment? To the
Court, this question dated back to the ratification debate and the intent of the drafters
of the Amendment. On this view, the drafters had simply sought to accord Congress the
same powers already granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause-in the first draft of
the opinion, in fact, Justice Brennan wrote that "[Section] 5 is merely a specific
counterpart of the Necessary and Proper Clause." 91 And so, after dispensing with the
obligatory cites to McCulloch v. Maryland2 and Ex Parte Virginia,93 the Court
explained that Section 5 "is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress
to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." 94 Or, in the classic language of
McCulloch, the constitutional question broke down into three separate inquiries:
whether section 4(e) was "appropriate legislation" to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, whether it was "plainly adapted to that end," and whether it was in accord




These questions offered the Court nary a challenge. On the first, "[tihere can be no
doubt" that section 4(e) was "appropriate legislation" to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment. After all, the enactment "may be viewed as a measure to secure for the
Puerto Rican community residing in New York nondiscriminatory treatment by
government., 96 The second question proved no more difficult. The Court explained
that the nullification of the New York literacy requirement as applied to Puerto Ricans
would result in enhanced political power, which will in turn "be helpful in gaining
nondiscriminatory treatment in public services for the entire Puerto Rican
community., 97 Tellingly, the Court further explained that "[i]t was for Congress, as the
branch that made that judgment, to assess and weigh the various conflicting
considerations., 98 The role for the Court was limited indeed: "It is not for us to review
the congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a
basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did." 99 This conclusion
held true if focused instead on section 4(e) as eliminating an invidious voting
qualification, as Congress brought a "specially informed legislative competence" to
this question and it was its "prerogative to weigh these competing considerations."
'100
On the third question, the argument was that limiting section 4(e) to those educated
in American-flag schools worked an invidious discrimination on those Puerto Ricans
residing in New York yet educated elsewhere. The Court turned this challenge aside as
91. Justice Brennan, Original Draft of Katzenbach v. Morgan 4 (Brennan Papers, Library of
Congress, Box 1:132, folder 5, copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
92. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
93. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
94. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651.
95. See id. (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 321).
96. Id. at 652 (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 653.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 656.
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well, concluding that Congress need not "strike at all evils at the same time;"' 0' rather,
"reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem
which seems most acute to the legislative mind."' 2 More specifically, the choice to
limit section 4(e) as Congress did "may... reflect Congress['s] greater familiarity with
the quality of instruction in American flag schools, a recognition of the unique historic
relationship between the Congress and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,"'0 3 or the
explicit endorsement of past congressional policies. Deference was the order of the
day.
This was a curious conclusion, particularly in light of the formidable obstacle posed
by the Lassiter case. Yet, to the Justices, Morgan was an easy case. For Justice White,
for example, this was simply "a congressional definition of 'equal protection;
' 104
while Chief Justice Warren contended that "Congress need not make findings if it can
justify its conduct on any rational basis,"'0 5 a position with which Justice Fortas
agreed.1°6 Justice Douglas disagreed with the Chief Justice and would have reversed
even in the absence of a statute, 10 7 as he argued in his dissent in Cardona v. Power,1
08
and Justice Black was "happy to agree to this historic opinion which for the first time
gives [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment the full scope [he thought] it was
intended to have."'"09 During conference, Justice Stewart "ha[d] difficulty finding it is
'appropriate' because it is non-discriminating so far as race is concerned," and
according to Justice Douglas's conference notes, he "ha[d] trouble but would try to
reverse."'1"0 Only Justice Harlan was prepared to affirm the lower court opinion, as he
contended that "Congress can't define what is equal protection."'II
The case proved so easy, in fact, that the Court did not bother with any mention of
legislative findings. After all, "[i]t was for Congress, as the branch that made this
judgment, to assess and weigh the various conflicting considerations."' 12 The Court
took this point quite far, explaining that: "It is not for us to review the congressional
resolution of these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which
the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did."' 13 One may explain this relaxed
posture in two ways. First, and as Justice Harlan pointed out in dissent, "[t]here is
101. Id. at 657 (citing Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 294 U.S. 608,610 (1935)).
102. Id. (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,489 (1955)).
103. Id. at 657-58 (emphasis added)..
104. Justice Douglas, Notes from Katzenbach v. Morgan Conference 2 (Apr. 22, 1966)
(Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1372, copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
105. Id. at 1.
106. Id. at 2.
107. Id. at 1.
108. 384 U.S. 672, 675 (1966).
109. Justice Black, Note to Justice Brennan (May 23, 1966) (Brennan Papers, Library of
Congress, Box 1:143, folder 5, case file nos. 847 and 877, copy on file with the Indiana Law
Journal) (emphasis in original).
110. Douglas, supra note 104. Justice Stewart ultimately joined Justice Harlan's dissent, but
only after its third circulation, on June 10, three days before the opinion was published. Justice
Harlan, 5th Draft of Katzenbach v. Morgan I (Brennan Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1: 143,
copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (circulated June 10, 1966).
111. Harlan, supra note 110.




simply no legislative record supporting such hypothesized discrimination of the sort we
have hitherto insisted upon when congressional power is brought to bear on
constitutionally reserved state concerns."' 4 On this view, to require findings in this
case must necessarily lead to invalidating the challenged provision, as Congress had
not proffered any such findings. Second, it may be said that the Court was simply
clarifying its signals in South Carolina about the need for findings in support of
legislation. To those who understood the South Carolina case as establishing a rigid
requirement for legislative findings," 5 the Morgan opinion was clearly indicating
otherwise.
To my mind, the way to explain Morgan is neither by pointing to a lack of standards
nor by turning away from anything the Court might have said in South Carolina.
Rather, Morgan revisited the debate begun in the draft of the South Carolina opinion
between Justice Brennan and the Chief Justice. Justice Brennan in Morgan was simply
situating the case within the doctrine as he understood it. Findings played no role in
this argument.
2. Institutional Competence and the Famed Ratchet
The second disagreement appeared more difficult to overcome. In the first
circulated draft of his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan complained that the Court was
abrogating its own powers at the expense of Congress. To his mind, once the Court
upheld the literacy test in Lassiter, Congress could no longer decide otherwise absent a
showing of discrimination. Otherwise, he argued:
I do not see why Congress should not be able as well to exercise its [Section] 5
"discretion" in the other direction by enacting statutes cutting down on equal
protection and due process decisions of this Court which it deems not in accord
with social or political realities and unduly restrictive upon the authority of the
States.' 16
Justice Brennan anticipated this argument from the time he penned his first draft of
the opinion. He closed this draft the following way:
One last observation is necessary. The dissent will suggest that our holding as to
the scope of [Section] 5 power may mean that Congress has power to exercise
discretion in the other direction, and enact statutes which in effect dilute equal
protection and due process decisions of this Court. We emphatically hold that
[Section] 5, as we today construe it, does not grant Congress any such power.
Section 5 is limited to adapting [sic] measures to enforce the guarantees of the
Amendment. Section 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate or dilute
these guarantees." 1
7
114. Id. at 669 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
115. See id. at 667 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (contending that the holding in South Carolina
hinged on the existence of a "voluminous legislative history"); Bryant & Simeone, supra note
74, at 365.
116. Justice Harlan's dissent, Katzenbach v. Morgan 10 (June 8, 1966) (Brennan Papers,
Library of Congress, Box 1: 143, folder 6, copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
117. Justice Brennan, Original draft of Katzenbach v. Morgan 9 (Brennan Papers, Library of
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Curiously, this language disappeared from the draft by the time it circulated on May
20. Justice Harlan had voiced his minority position during conference on April 22 and
apparently waited for Justice Brennan's draft before penning his own dissent, or even
deciding what to do. Once Brennan's draft circulated, Harlan informed the Justices on
May 23 that he would circulate a dissent "[i]n due course."' 18 The dissent finally
circulated on June 8, and Justice Brennan immediately responded with an amended
draft, which reintroduced the aforementioned language as part of footnote ten." 9
This exchange and Justice Brennan's ultimate resolution demonstrate how far the
Court was willing to go in upholding civil rights legislation. Under Morgan, Congress
is granted great latitude to improvise and further the cause of equality. Put another
way:
For the future the decision logically permits the generalization that Congress, in
the field of state activities and except as confined by the Bill of Rights, has the
power to enact any law which may be viewed as a measure for correction of any
condition which Congress might believe involves a denial of equality or other
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment rights. 2°
This hope proved short lived, as the Court soon turned away from this broad reading of
congressional powers in Oregon v. Mitchell.'12 The "one-way ratchet" argument only
proved useful in one case and is now a relic of the past. This raises important questions
at the heart of the next Part: how did the Court respond to subsequent challenges to the
Voting Rights Act? Did it demonstrate a similar disinclination to confront the difficult
arguments posed by the Act? And is the so-called federalism revolution likely to affect
this forgiving posture?
II. THE ACT IN CONTEXT: CLASH OF REVOLUTIONS?
It is now apparent that the United States is in the midst of a constitutional
revolution. For the most part, it is a quiet revolution. 1
22
[I]t looks like they have got some kind of a computer where when you talk about
voting rights for blacks, you press a certain button, out comes the text of the
speech which is to be given. The speech of course is that this is an invasion of
States' rights. This will prevent the good relationship between the whites and
Congress, Box 1: 143, folder 5, copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (Justice Brennan's
handwritten notes on draft).
118. Memorandum from Justice Harlan to the Conference, New York Voting Cases 1 (May
23, 1966) (Warren Papers, Library of Congress, Box 531, folder 5, case file nos. 673, 847, and
877, copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
119. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,651 n.10 (1966); Justice Brennan, Draft of
Katzenbach v. Morgan 10 (June 8, 1966) (Brennan Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1:143,
folder 5, case file no. 847 and 877, copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (Justice
Brennan's handwritten notes on draft).
120. Cox, supra note 1, at 107.
121. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); see Frickey, supra note 74, at 714.
122. Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1601 (2002).
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blacks from continuing. The Founding Fathers guaranteed the States the right to
be sovereign. 1
23
South Carolina and Morgan can only be understood in reference to the times and
their place in the history of the civil rights movement. Political leaders of the time
made use of the palpable moral outrage felt across the nation in enacting a very strong
voting rights bill into law. The Voting Rights Act required a very special set of social
and political conditions. The Court clearly took notice and gave way to the needs and
sentiments of the times. More importantly, the Court has displayed a similar posture in
subsequent challenges to the Act. This story offers a consistent picture of what I term
"voting rights exceptionalism" and the Court's almost unfettered deference to Congress
under circumstances that warrant, at the very least, an argument.
Yet, with apologies to Bob Dylan, the times have clearly changed and the past
might no longer prove helpful. This argument takes us back to 1995 and the Lopez
decision, where the Court struck down a federal statute as beyond the powers of
Congress under the Commerce Clause. 24 Lopez was soon followed by Seminole
Tribe, 1 City of Boerne,"' Morrison,127 Kimel,121 and Garrett,129 cases that
collectively show a deep judicial sensitivity to federalism concerns and the rights of
states to conduct their own affairs free of federal intrusion. These cases form the basis
for what is commonly known as the federalism revolution. 130 While the import and
scope of these decisions remains elusive and contested,' 31 it is unassailably true that the
Court has shown a remarkable concern over questions of states' rights and federalism
in general.
Under this lens, the recent extension of the Act would appear to stand very little
chance at the hands of a Court majority. Without question, the Voting Rights Act
pushes very hard against any existing limits on congressional powers. Its import may
be charitably categorized as onerous, for it deprives a covered jurisdiction of the right
to enact laws that may fall under the purview of the Act. In essence, the Act requires a
covered jurisdiction to come to the federal government and seek approval for any
123. Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 407, S. 903, S. 1297, S.
1409, and S. 1443 Before Subcomm. on Const. Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong. 50 (1975) (statement of Clarence Mitchell, Dir. for the Wash. Bureau, NAACP).
124. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
125. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
126. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
127. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
128. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
129. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
130. See Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette ofFederalism: New York,
Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 71; Daniel A. Farber, Pledging a New Allegiance:
An Essay on Sovereignty and the New Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1135 (2000);
Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2004).
131. See MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 249-78 (2005); JESSE H. CHOPER & JOHN C. YOO, Who's Afraid of the
Eleventh Amendment? The Limited Impact of the Court's Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 213 (2006).
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changes in its voting laws. The Act thus compromises the sovereignty of the covered
jurisdictions in severe, perhaps inimitable ways. 132
Congress was fully aware of the radical nature of its proposal. This accounts for the
ten-year shelf life of the coverage formula, which was ultimately reduced in the final
bill to five years. As Representative Don Edwards, the subcommittee chairman during
the 1975 House hearings, explained:
The act that was the result of this frustration was a radical bill. It was bent on
results without delay. It was also designed to be temporary. After a few years of
harsh measures, the practices of a lifetime would be reversed and special federal
protection would no longer be necessary.133
The recent extension of the Act pushes as hard as any legislation can push against
the federalism revolution of recent vintage. During the 1982 debates, for example,
many members of Congress and the administration pointed to the temporary nature of
the Act as partial proof of the constitutionality of the statute in light of the grave
federalism costs it exacts. And in City of Boerne, the Court once again pointed to the
temporary nature of the law in defense of its constitutionality. 134 How could the
preclearance provision possibly survive the recent federalism revolution?
This Part responds to this question in two ways. The first section examines the
evolution of the Court's assessment of the constitutionality of the Act. This has been a
deferential posture, which places the Court within a scholarly tradition that views the
Court as seldom out of step with public opinion as reflected in enacted legislation. The
second section conjectures whether this posture will be influenced by the recent
federalism cases. This section orients these cases to the Katzenbach cases and their
progeny and concludes inter alia that the question of legislative findings is ultimately a
question ofjudicial will. The question, then, will not be whether the federalism cases
will swallow up the Voting Rights Act but, rather, whether the Court ultimately
chooses to take this step.
A. Lessons from the Past: South Carolina and Morgan
The lessons of the Katzenbach cases boil down to this: in the face of a national
disgrace, the Court sent Congress a clear signal that the path of reform was clear and
open ended. The Court would not get in the way of the civil rights revolution, even
under circumstances-as seen in Morgan-that seemed, at best, unorthodox.1
35
132. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 336 (2d ed. 1988) (asserting
that the Voting Rights Act is "probably the most radical piece of civil rights legislation since
Reconstruction").
133. Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 939, H.R. 2148, H.R. 3247, and
H.R. 3501 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Const. Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong. 887 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 House Hearings].
134. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997).
135. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Letting Politics Make Law: The Judicial Restraint of the
Warren Court 20-25 (situating the Katzenbach cases within a restraintist account of the Warren
Court) (Dec. 12, 2006) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
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This conclusion places the Court and its handling of the Act in distinct company. As
Robert Dahl concluded in an important early essay, "the policy views dominant on the
Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the
lawmaking majorities of the United States.' 36 There will be glitches, of course, and
majorities will sometimes have to try harder and persist in their quest for the enactment
of their policy preferences in the face of a recalcitrant Court. These moments will
mainly arise during transitional periods, when the old majority is declining and a new
majority is rising in its place. This conclusion follows by definition, as elected officials
reflect the policy-making evolution, while judicial life tenure ensures that federal
judges do not. 13
7
Decades later, Richard Funston similarly concluded that:
[I]t is not merely that during critical periods of partisan realignment the Court is
more likely to declare recently enacted federal legislation unconstitutional than at
other times, but that during realigning periods this is the very sort of congressional
legislation which is most likely to be nullified by the Court! 138
As part of the old coalition, the Court is able to carry on its policy-making agenda
until the new majority gets a chance to appoint its own judicial officers. More to the
point, all recent legislation enacted by the new majority is more likely to be struck
down by the Court than all other statutes. Surely, the Constitution does not change
from one period to the next, but policies, some leading bureaucrats, and politicians do.
That the Court is more willing to interfere with recent legislation by new majorities
136. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957), reprinted in 50 EMORY L.J. 563 (2001).
137. On this last point, Dahl provided little evidence but "apparently arrive[s] at [it]
impressionistically on the basis of logical deduction." Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and
Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 795, 796 (1975).
138. Id. at 806. David Adamany provides a similar assessment in the context of the Court's
legitimating capacity:
May not this more modest legitimacy of the Supreme Court, then, cast it in
realigning election periods as the reef upon which the vessel of reform is
shattered? In the early stages of each new electoral coalition party majorities tend
to be inflated. Spurred by the ideological zeal common among those long out of
power and by the national crisis, these large majorities move toward sweeping
reform. But the Supreme Court, because of its composition and its checking
power, stands in the way or seems to. Finally the new coalition's leadership, often
its most reformist wing and usually the Executive, concludes that it must curb the
Court.
It is at this moment that the Court's legitimacy is important, for elements of the
coalition's elected elite and of its electoral base now hold back in reverence to a
constitutional institution, whose actions and functions they may or may not fully
understand or approve. The coalition is thus divided over an issue of constitutional
structure; the energies, resources, and zeal of the reformist wing of the coalition
are diverted to that struggle; the leadership's hold over the looselyjoined alliance
is weakened; and the momentum for substantive policy change is slowed or
stopped.




tells us a great deal about the Court and its role as part of the policy-making governing
coalition. Funston thus agreed with Dahl that the Court, while a national policy-making
institution, is an integral member of the governing national majority. Or, put in Mr.
Dooley's more colloquial terms, "no matther whether th' constitution follows th' flag
or not, th' supreme coort follows th' illiction returns."'1
39
In a recent essay, Mark Tushnet offered an important variation of this conclusion.
He began by identifying a puzzle: if the Court is part of the national political order as
Dahl and Funston suggest, how do we explain the institution ofjudicial review and the
power to set the Court in direct conflict with governing majorities? Or, as he wrote,
"[h]ow can we understand judicial review as part of a stable political system?' 40 In
response, Tushnet offered a view of the Court as a collaborative institution, able to
stand against some parts of the political order while at the same time collaborating with
others. This collaboration had both geographic and temporal components. On the
former, the Court could collaborate with its national partners against state and local
actors; on the latter, Tushnet implicitly tracked the Dahl-Funston thesis and explained
that the Court could side with present ruling coalitions and against compromises from
prior political orders. Both components are supported by the Court's handling of the
Voting Rights Act and its various extensions.
Without question, the Court behaved as a member of the national ruling coalition
and collaborated with Congress and the Johnson administration in the fight against
racial discrimination in voting. The evidence on this point is both internal and
external. 14 1 The internal evidence comes in the form of doctrine and a professed
adherence to precedent, which both opinions clearly display. The Morgan case is
particularly forceful here, as it may be said that the Morgan power was sui generis and
came into existence only due to the exigencies of the case, only to be thrown into the
dustbin of history by the next term. Taken together, the Katzenbach cases highlight
what this section terms "voting rights exceptionalism." Their leading theme is one of
deference to congressional judgments in an area ofthe law where Congress brings both
its special competence to the questions presented, "and special reasons to limit the
powers of the states."'
142
The external evidence is also very strong. To many critics of the Act, it remained an
open question whether the Court would ultimately examine the legislation impartially,
as it would any other congressional enactment. During the House hearings, for
example, former Representative Albert Watson complained: "Where else can we turn?
We see the Supreme Court sitting on the House floor wildly applauding legislative
recommendations. Can we expect impartial examination of these proposals by that
139. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, The Supreme Court's Decisions, in MR. DooLEY's OPINIoNs 21,
26(1901).
140. Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court and the National Political Order: Collaboration
and Confrontation, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 117
(Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006).
141. For the debate over internal/external explanations in particular reference to Justice
Roberts's "switch in time," see Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the
New Deal, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1052 (2005).
142. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 262 (1983) (Burger, C.J., joined by Powell, J.,
Rehnquist, J., and O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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body if they become law?"' 143 They made this point often, and for apparent good
measure. 144 More damningly, the critics further complained that some members of the
Court had met with members of the administration in order to advise the drafters of the
law on whether the proposal would meet with the Court's approval. 145 On this view, the
challenge to the Act did not stand a chance at the hands of a Court majority hell-bent
on rubber-stamping the policy measures of the ruling elite.
The temporal aspect of the collaboration thesis also finds much support in the case
law and is strengthened by the sunset provision of the Act. The theory is quite
straightforward: as a collaborative institution, the Court will side with the present
ruling coalition and against compromises from the old order. In the Voting Rights Act
context, we would thus expect the Court to strike down the Act once the present ruling
coalition ceases to support it. Yet the Act is a peculiar piece of legislation in that its
sunset provision demands a continuous public expression of support. Thanks to this
expiration date, then, we know that the Act holds much support from a diverse
coalition and has been supported by almost every administration since its inception. If
history is any guide, the Court will side with the Act and the national coalitions that
embraced it.
We also know, however, that the federalism revolution has gained important
adherents within the White House, as both Presidents Nixon and Reagan spoke of a
return to a New Federalism and devolution to state authority.146 And so the question
would appear to focus not on the aftermath of the inevitable collision between
principles of federalism on the one had and race and voting on the other but, rather, on
whether the federalism revival has any traction among ruling elites and the coalitions to
which they belong. Note that this is precisely the question faced by Congress during
the recent amendment and extension of the Act. If any such clash of revolutions ever
existed, the ruling majority has clearly taken sides with the Act and against the New
Federalism. The Court's handling of the Act has reflected this reality and there is
nothing to suggest that the Court will not follow a similar path in the future.
Consider City of Boerne, where the Court offered the 1965 Act-not its various
amendments-as an exemplary use of the Section 5 power. 147 City ofBoerne is telling
for how it glosses over much of the short history of the Act. For example, the Court did
not have much to say about section 4(e) of the Act, upheld in Katzenbach v.
143. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 4, at 623. On the day after President Johnson's
address to the nation, Justice Douglas sent a note to the White House, telling the President that
the address had been "absolutely superb.., the best ever." William 0. Douglas to Lyndon B.
Johnson, 16 March 1965, LBJ Library, Busby Papers, Box 3, quoted in DAVID J. GARROw,
PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 108
(1978).
144. As James Kilpatrick, vice-chairman of the Virginia Commission on Constitutional
Government and one of the more thoughtful critics of the bill, complained, "it is... unfortunate
that members of the Supreme Court of the United States appeared-turned up to here [sic] the
President's message and appeared on the television cameras applauding. I think this is a
violation of the separation of powers of the United States and creates imbalances." 1965 Senate
Hearings, supra note 3, at 642.
145. See id.
146. Timothy Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 WASH U. L.Q. 229, 298 (2005).
147. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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Morgan,1 48 or Oregon v. Mitchell, which upheld a nationwide literacy test ban on
jurisdictions not covered under the Act, 49 other than to suggest that neither case stood
for the view that Congress had "a substantive, non-remedial power."5 0 The Court did
acknowledge a reading of Morgan that would appear to afford Congress the power to
enact legislation that expands Fourteenth Amendment rights, yet did not give this
argument its due, explaining that "[tjhis is not a necessary interpretation, however, or
even the best one."'
15 1
Similarly, the Court said precious little about City ofRome, a case where the Court
refused to "disturb Congress['s] considered judgment"'' 5 2 as codified under the Act, nor
did it mention Mississippi Republican Executive Committee v. Brooks,153 which upheld
the 1982 Amendments, at all. These cases raised difficult issues under the newly-
minted proportional and congruent standard, yet the Court did not offer a clear and
persuasive explanation about how these cases fit under the Court's doctrine.' 4 About
City of Rome, for example, the Court wrote that the covered jurisdictions could avoid
the challenged provision under certain conditions, and it also lapsed in seven years.
Lest one get the impression that the constitutional test required "termination dates,
geographic restrictions or egregious predicates,"' 5 the Court made clear that this was
not so. Rather, the point of these limitations is that they "tend to ensure Congress['s]
means are proportionate to ends legitimate under [Section] 5.'' s6 The Court's silence
on Brooks is particularly telling about a future challenge to the Act, as Congress had
explicitly responded to the Court's conclusion in City of Mobile as applied to section 2
of the Act and essentially overturned an earlier ruling. If the Court had nothing to say
after the 1982 Amendments to the Act, there is little to suggest that the Court will have
anything to say in response to the 2006 Amendments, which were similarly responding
to past rulings.
Further proof of the collaborative thesis is found in Lopez v. Monterey County,15 7 a
case decided two years after City ofBoerne. In Monterey County, the Court once again
upheld the constitutionality of the Act while concluding that a non-covered state must
seek preclearance of a law before implementing it on a covered jurisdiction. In light of
City of Boerne and the federalism revolution in our midst, this result was mildly
surprising. 158 But to the Court, this challenge was old news, hardly worth the time to
engage the arguments seriously. For example, the Court began by noting its long-
standing precedents (that is, South Carolina; City of Rome) for the proposition that
congressional powers can intrude into areas traditionally reserved for the states. After
148. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
149. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
150. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527.
151. Id. at 527-28.
152. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 178 (1980).
153. 469 U.S. 1002 (1984) (mem.).
154. Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boeme v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 743, 748-52 (1998).
155. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533.
156. Id.
157. 525 U.S. 266 (1999).




further noting that the result in the case is required by the statutory text and federal
regulations, the Court came back to the refrain that this is old news, the outcome
decided long ago. "In short," the Court concluded, "the Voting Rights Act, by its
nature, intrudes on state sovereignty. The Fifteenth Amendment permits this intrusion,
however, and our holding today adds nothing of constitutional moment to the burdens
that the Act imposes."'
' 59
The conclusion is inescapable: the Court has not tried very hard to subject the
Voting Rights Act to probing constitutional scrutiny. In response, it may be that the
Court simply accords Congress far more latitude when legislating about race than when
legislating in related areas.' 60 Or else, it may be that the Court has not felt the need to
strike down the Act, or even consider its constitutionality all that seriously, because it
has chosen the parallel tack of interpreting the Act as narrowly as possible.'
61
These arguments boil down to the question ofjudicial will. Whether Congress has
more evidentiary latitude to regulate protected categories, or as a question of
constitutional interpretation, the Court's posture is one of clear deference to the policy
choices of the national ruling coalition. This approach to the Act is neither new nor
surprising, for it places the Court squarely within its political question tradition. More
specifically, the Court is within the prudential strand of the doctrine, "an area where
the Court has historically masked its political judgments under the veneer of law and
principled decision making."'162 This has been true from the moment the Court decided
the Katzenbach cases and has continued throughout the life of the Act. But make no
mistake: this has been a choice, no different from the choice to remove the judiciary
from the political gerrymandering arena, 163 to decide presidential elections, 164 or to
strike down majority minority districts under the guise of equal protection. 165
And so, for the future, the question remains the same: whether the Court will
continue to demonstrate a deferential and collaborative posture towards the Act. Put
another way, the question is whether the so-called federalism revolution will alter the
Court's handling of the constitutionality of the Act.
B. Tracking the New Federalism: Findings
The federalism revolution began in earnest in 1995, with United States v. Lopez,'
66
blossomed two years later, with City ofBoerne v. Flores,167 and may be said to have
159. Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 284-85 (1999); see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
952, 991-92 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (contending that the 1982 Amendments to the
Act are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality).
160. Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional
Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 39, 68-70 (1995).
161. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997), and, 528 U.S. 320
(2000).
162. Fuentes-Rohwer, Reconsidering, supra note 22, at 1949.
163. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).
164. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
165. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
166. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
167. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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reached its zenith four years after that in Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett.168 Taken together, these cases offer three related insights on the
question of congressional powers generally, and as applied to the Voting Rights Act in
particular. This Section concludes that the federalism cases will not alter the question
of congressional powers. In the end, and as Justice Brennan worried in the Katzenbach
cases, the fate of the Act will remain a question ofjudicial will.
1. Legislative Findings
The first insight is the recurring issue of legislative findings. Recall in this vein the
debate between Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan over the need for findings.
Justice Brennan worried about the future and the ways in which the Court's holdings
could be interpreted. The Court need not say more than necessary. Chief Justice
Warren worried instead about the perceptions surrounding the Act, which explained the
central role that findings appeared to play in his South Carolina opinion.
Justice Brennan's concerns were prescient. In Lopez, the Court underscored the fact
that Congress need not include legislative findings as part of its legislation. 69 Yet the
Court did explain that findings would help it "evaluate the legislative judgment" that
the activity in question substantially affects interstate commerce, especially during
those times when such an effect is not "visible to the naked eye."' 170 In City ofBoerne,
the Court similarly pointed to the legislative record as lacking support for the
legislation under review.171 And Garrett took this concern over findings much farther,
explaining that the legislative record in support of the Americans with Disabilities Act
"simply fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state
discrimination in employment against the disabled."' 7 2 The Court conceded that the
record had some examples involving state discrimination against the disabled, but
"these incidents taken together fall far short of even suggesting the pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination on which [Section] 5 legislation must be based."'
173
Justice Brennan's concerns proved prophetic for a second and far more important
reason. The Voting Rights Act has become the hallmark of civil rights legislation, and
the early voting rights cases have followed suit as the epitome of congressional action
and legislative findings. In City ofBoerne, for example, the Court nodded approvingly
to the Voting Rights Act and "the record which confronted Congress and the
Judiciary,"'174 as opposed to the lack of a record in support of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 7' (RFRA). Garrett similarly offered that the contrast between
the evidence in support of the Voting Rights Act and the evidence in support of the
Americans with Disabilities Act was "stark."' 176 Tellingly, the Court pointed
approvingly to some of the language in South Carolina to which Justice Brennan
168. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
169. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63.
170. Id. at 563.
171. City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
172. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.
173. Id. at 370.
174. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
175. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000).
176. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
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objected-where the Court noted that "[b]efore enacting the measure, Congress
explored with great care the problem of racial discrimination in voting."' 177 Clearly,
Justice Brennan's fears have come to pass.
The more recent Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs178 and
Tennessee v. Lane,7 9 cases where the Court upheld congressional exercises of its
Section 5 power, support this conclusion. In Hibbs, the Court examined the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993,180 a federal statute that entitles some employees to a
maximum of twelve weeks of unpaid leave for any of a number ofreasons and creates a
private right of action against states that violate rights established under the statute.
Two aspects of the opinion are worth noting. First, the Court underscored that
Congress was aiming its considerable powers at the problem of gender discrimination.
Such discriminations are subject to heightened scrutiny review under the Fourteenth
Amendment in its self-executing sense, which means that the states must justify such
discriminations only by identifying the important state interests they seek to further.' 81
Given heightened scrutiny, it is thus easier for Congress to show unconstitutional
discrimination.
This argument suggests that the Voting Rights Act is on safe constitutional ground:
as racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny review and are presumptively
unconstitutional, most of the behavior targeted by the Act violates the Fourteenth
Amendment and Congress has an easier time seeking to remedy such activities. The
Court offered as much in Hibbs.1
82
And yet, to turn to the second important aspect of the case, the rest of the opinion
betrayed this cautious optimism and placed Hibbs in line with the Court's body of work
dating back to the Katzenbach cases. In suggesting an easier path for Congress when
enacting statutes in contexts that require heightened judicial scrutiny, the Court also
made clear that its review of congressional statutes will hinge on the state of the
evidence proffered by Congress. In Hibbs, for example, the Court concluded that "the
States' record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based
discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the
enactment of prophylactic [Section] 5 legislation." 8 3 Tellingly, Justice Kennedy took
issue with this conclusion, noting that "[t]he evidence [of gender discrimination] must
be far more specific, however, than a simple recitation of a general history of
employment discrimination against women."18 4 To the Court, "the extent and
specificity" of congressional findings in support of the Act was enough; to the
dissenting Justices, however, "simply noting the problem is not a substitute for
evidence which identifies some real discrimination that family leave rules are designed
to prevent."'
185
177. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
178. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
179. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
180. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. &
29 U.S.C.).
181. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 735.




The same dynamic played out in Lane. To the majority, the "sheer volume of
evidence... justified] Congress['s] exercise of its prophylactic power."' 8 6 In fact, this
record "far exceeds the record ofHibbs."'87 Yet, to the dissent, "the majority identifies
nothing in the legislative record that shows Congress was responding to widespread
violations of the due process rights of disabled persons."'
188
These debates take us back to Justice Brennan and the Katzenbach cases. It is bad
enough that a reviewing court will uphold a statute or strike it down in accordance with
its view of the accompanying legislative record. Worse yet, the record only appears to
play a peripheral role in the case, as one's perception of the congressional handiwork is
not empirically verifiable. Rather, the outcome will likely hinge on one's view of the
issue and the questions presented. For example, how to explain the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Hibbs and his reading of the legislative record in
support of the statute? 89 In contrast, how to explain his dissent in Lane? This was
precisely the problem that Justice Brennan wished to avoid in his correspondence with
Chief Justice Warren.
Unsurprisingly, this argument for legislative findings in the voting rights context is
not new. In 1975, for example, Armand Derfier, then representing the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, maintained that Congress had secured
evidence in 1965 and after, so he thought that "Congress under the [Fifteenth]
[A]mendment is not required to seek new evidence in order to justify continued
enforcement of the [Fifteenth] [A]mendment."' 190 Kenneth Klee, the subcommittee's
associate counsel, retorted that "surely there is some time period when Congress needs
new facts and cannot just look back."' 9' Derfner answered in response, "I don't think
Congress could now ask a 50-year extension of a particular piece of legislation unless
it found it was likely inherently to create discrimination."' 92 Recent accounts have
made similar claims about this need for new evidence.' 93 It may be that the time to look
back has passed. As the exchange between Derfner and Klee underscores, however,
this is a question of degree. As this Section argues, it will also be a question ofjudicial
will and the Justices' willingness to uphold this important statute. Whether new
findings are needed, and how much will satisfy the Court, remains to be seen.
2. Congruence, Proportionality, and the Voting Rights Act as Model Legislation
The second insight looks to City of Boerne and its new standard for examining
exercises of congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
186. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 528 (2004).
187. Id. at511.
188. Id. at 541 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
189. See Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts,
andLaw, 117 HARV. L. REv. 4, 17-24 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, You've Come a Long Way, Baby:
Rehnquist's New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1871,
1871 (2006); Joan C. Williams, Hibbs as a Federalism Case; Hibbs as a Maternal Wall Case,
73 U. ON. L. REv. 365, 365 (2004).
190. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 133, at 637.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Hasen, supra note 21.
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Boerne, the Court struck down the RFRA as beyond congressional powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment. To the Court, an important distinction exists between
legislation that is remedial in nature-and thus constitutional under the Section 5
power-and legislation that seeks to exact a substantive change in the applicable law.
This is not always an easy distinction to draw. More particularly, the Court explained
that "[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."194 To the Court, the
congruence prong demands a close fit--or congruence-between the unconstitutional
conduct that the statute wishes to combat and the means used by Congress to fulfill
those ends. The proportionality prong looks instead to the problem Congress seeks to
address and demands that the means used by Congress be in proportion to these
perceived problems. Put another way, the number of cases that violate the Constitution
must be commensurate to the cases that violate the statute. In the end, an absence of
"congruence and proportionality" means that the legislation crosses the line from
remedial to substantive.
RFRA failed this exacting test. According to the Court, Congress did not even
attempt to document the harm that the statute sought to correct, and, moreover, the
statute was so broad and sweeping that "it cannot be understood as responsive to, or
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." 195 The conclusion was thus
inescapable that RFRA was not remedial legislation but an attempt by Congress to alter
the substantive contours of the Fourteenth Amendment. And this, the Court explained,
Congress may not do.
In contrast, the Court offered the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as an instance when
Congress acted within proper constitutional parameters. The Court offered the
following reasons: the Act had been confined to particular regions of the country where
the discrimination was more acute; it affected only voting laws, and not an amalgam of
state regulations; it included a bailout provision; and it had a termination date. 96 Also,
the evidence against which Congress was reacting was overwhelming and "unique
among modem legislation under the Enforcement Clauses."'197 The Court made clear
that when acting under its Section 5 power, Congress need not always include
"termination dates, geographic restrictions, or egregious predicates."' 198 Rather, these
limitations helped ensure that the means used by Congress are proportional to the
legitimate ends sought by the legislation.
Those familiar with the Act and its history might find this exaltation by the Court
rather odd, as few of the conditions to which the Court alluded have come to pass. To
begin, the Act applied quite explicitly to the South, and it is also fair to say that this
was the intention of those who drafted its provisions. Yet the coverage formula also
enveloped Alaska in 1965, and in subsequent years many other states and political
subdivisions outside of the South have come within the purview of the Act's
coverage. 199 Recall in this vein Solicitor General Cox's admonition about the irrational
194. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
195. Id. at 532.
196. See id. at 532-33.
197. See Laycock, supra note 154, at 748.
198. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533.
199. For example, after originally bailing out in the late 1960s, Alaska once again came
within the coverage of the Act in 1975. Texas and Arizona were also added to the list of covered
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nature of the coverage formula. 200 Further, the bailout provision has proven to be
nonexistent for any jurisdiction seeking to remove itself from coverage. 2 1 Also, while
the Act encompasses changes "with respect to voting," the Supreme Court has
interpreted this language expansively, to include, inter alia, annexations and personnel
decisions.20 2 It is also difficult to make much sense of the Act's termination date, in
light of its various extensions.
Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that the Act is model legislation under the
enforcement clauses only because the Court wishes for it to be so. As such, the
question for the future is not whether the Act as amended in 2006 is proportional and
congruent but, rather, whether the Act will be subject to a similarly warm reception at
the hands of the Roberts Court. The strongest version of this argument looks to the
sunset provision of the Act and is the subject of the next section; to wit, has the passage
of time affected the constitutionality of the statute?
3. The Pressures of Time
The third insight focuses on the temporary nature of the special provisions. This
appears to be the toughest hurdle for the Act to overcome. In the Court's view, the
special provisions of the Act were legitimate and permissive responses to a difficult
and long-lasting problem. For constitutional purposes, however, the Court only decided
in South Carolina that it was reasonable to draw this difficult line at five years. But
how far could this line extend? Attorney General Katzenbach recognized this point
early on during the Senate debates: "When you are talking in terms of particular years.
. . it is almost impossible to say 14 years is reasonable, 14 years and 1 day is
unreasonable, because you get into these gradations. '" 20 3 The context of Katzenbach's
comment was how far back the legislation may look for episodes of discrimination in
order to keep a particular jurisdiction within the Act's coverage, yet the sentiment
equally applies to the sunset provision of the Act. The Attorney General remarked that
ninety-five years would be too long, while ten years was clearly reasonable; and while
twenty years would be "probable, ' 204 forty years would be "quite unreasonable.,
20 5
The various extensions of the Act must be understood in this context. The initial
five-year window was a reasonable response, as were subsequent five- and seven-year
extensions.20 6 It must be the case that a constitutional limit exists someplace, especially
jurisdictions in 1975. Counties in California, New York, Florida, and South Dakota were added
to the list after the extensions in 1970 and 1976, as were townships in Michigan and New
Hampshire. See U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section Home Page:
Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/covered.htm (last
visited March 1, 2006).
200. Cox, supra note 30, at 1.
201. For a discussion of the bailout formula and its application since 1965, see Michael P.
McDonald, Who's Covered? Coverage Formula and Bailout, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT 255 (David Epstein et al. eds., 2006).
202. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971); Dougherty County v. White, 439 U.S.
32 (1978).
203. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 84.
204. Id. at 83.
205. Id. at 84.




in light of the exacting federalism costs imposed by the Act. But it is also true that the
Court has shown a remarkable willingness to afford Congress much leeway in this area,
explaining in City of Rome that "Congress['s] considered determination that at least
another 7 years of statutory remedies were necessary to counter the perpetuation of 95
years of pervasive voting discrimination is both unsurprising and unassailable. ' 2°7 Two
years later, and under the same "considered determination," Congress extended the Act
twenty-five years, bringing the grand total up to forty-two years. Surely Congress must
be pushing against the constitutional limit after the last extension of the Act. Would
another twenty-five year extension survive a constitutional challenge?
During the 1969 hearings, A. F. Summer, Mississippi's Attorney General, argued in
this vein that "if there does not come a time when you can say this is the end then it
may as well be in perpetuity. '208 And during the 1975 hearings, M. Caldwell Butler, a
member of the subcommittee, asked whether the net effect of these extensions "is to
say that as long as the time limit keeps getting extended and eludes us, it is impossible
for a state which came under that triggering device to get out from under it?' 209 In
response to this question, Stone Barefield, a member of the Mississippi House of
Representatives, labeled the Act "a law in perpetuity as far as we are concerned., 210
Representative Butler added: "Now do you have any doubts about the ability under the
U.S. Constitution of the Congress to impose this, or use this triggering device as it
becomes more remote from the present time? Does it ever become
unconstitutional? ' '211 This question will be at the forefront of a renewed challenge to
further extensions to the special provisions of the Act.
The 1982 debates offered further evidence of the general concerns over the
temporal aspects of the Act. In the House, the bill out of committee proposed to extend
the Act "in perpetuity," subject to a bail-out provision for covered jurisdictions.212
Representatives Hyde and Lungren disagreed with this choice on constitutional
grounds while offering as one of the Court's central reasons for upholding the Act "the
belief that the 1965 departure from historical tenets of federalism was only
'temporary.' 213 During the Senate hearings, Senator Hatch similarly offered the
temporary nature of the Act as one of the reasons for its constitutionality,214 as did
Attorney General William French Smith.2t5 The Senate report similarly concluded that
207. 446 U.S. at 182.
208. 1969 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 141.
209. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 133, at 711.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. H. REP. No. 97-227, at 2 (1981).
213. See id. at 57 (Supplemental Views of Rep. Henry J. Hyde and Rep. Dan Lungren).
214. Voting Rights Act: Hearings on S. 53, S. 1761, S. 1975, S. 1992, and S. 3112 Before
Subcomm. on Const. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1085 (1982) [hereinafter
1982 Senate Hearings]. He also contended that the Act had been upheld "subject to a
recognition that such a requirement was permissible only to address the 'exceptional' conditions
then existing in the South." Id.; see also S. REP. No. 97-417, at 166 (1982).
215. The Attorney General offered three reasons: its temporary nature; the finding that the
covered jurisdictions "had been found by Congress to have violated their constitutional
obligations"; and the fact that the covered jurisdictions could ultimately bail out. See 1982
Senate Hearings, supra note 214, at 69.
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"[t]he constitutional foundation of the Voting Rights Act rested in large part upon its
temporary and remedial nature."216 In light of the recent 25-year extension of the Act,
this argument promises to come back in full force.
If the recent "federalism revolution" serves as a useful guide, extensions to the
Voting Rights Act should face a stiff constitutional test. Regardless of how much
evidence Congress can collate, or whether the Act meets the recently developed
congruence and proportionality test, the Court will face a challenge to the Act from a
far different posture than it faced in 1965 and 1980. This time around, the Court will
have to face questions over whether Congress can implement such "stringent" and
"uncommon" methods against covered jurisdictions indefinitely. Put a different way:
would the Act be a reasonable response to the problem of racial discrimination had the
trigger formula and the preclearance requirement been extended sixty-seven years from
their inception?
But in fairness to the Act and its various extensions, this is not what Congress has
done. The coverage of the Act upon covered jurisdictions grew incrementally, a small
step at a time. It may be said that the 1982 Amendments went too far, too fast in
extending the life of the Act for twenty-five years, especially in comparison to the
previous three extensions put together, when Congress extended the Act a mere
seventeen years. Yet the point is still the same: Congress moved only as fast as it
deemed necessary, weighing the problem as then understood and the solution as then
deemed proper. In 1965 and 1970, Congress could determine that the special
provisions of the Act must only extend for five years, yet in 1975 they must extend
seven years, in order to cover the 1980 redistricting round. And in 1982, Congress had
a seventeen-year history from which to determine that twenty-five years was a
necessary extension. In extending the Act to the year 2032, the 109th Congress maybe
understood-if charitably so-to have made a similar determination.
This argument is analogous to a position taken by the Supreme Court in a related
context. In Grutter v. Bollinger,217 the Court upheld a race-conscious admissions
program against a facial attack on equal protection grounds. More importantly for
present purposes, the Court admonished that "[w]e expect that 25 years from now, the
use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved
today., 218 As in the Voting Rights Act context, this temporal target suggests that a
university may not extend its race conscious policies indeterminately; or at least, that
the Court will not condone them in perpetuity. This is simply a window, a target for the
Court and policy-makers. And just as educators must periodically revisit the question,
so has Congress with reference to the Act. Thus, so long as Grutter remains good law,
judicial consistency demands a similar outcome in the Voting Rights Act context.
CONCLUSION
Scholars of real revolutions would be amused by the Rehnquist Court 'sfederalism
revolution. Not a single central feature of the New Deal's regulatory regime was
overturned in that revolution, nor were central elements of the Great Society's
programs displaced. The federalism revolution snipped off some stray excesses in
216. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 166 (1982).
217. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
218. Id. at 343.
2007]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
Congress's actions and suggested that perhaps the Great Society's rights
revolution had gone too far. It did little to rein in that revolution, though.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 spawned a new era of voting rights law while
exacting significant federalism costs on the jurisdictions covered by its triggering
formula. In the early case law interpreting the Act, the Supreme Court upheld the law
and interpreted its provisions broadly. Yet, as Congress has gradually extended the
sunset provisions of the Act, the justifications for the Act have evolved from those then
existing in 1965. In this way, the Court will face a far different piece of legislation than
it faced in 1965. For the next challenge, the Court will have to face up to the
permanency question: with all the extensions up to this point, the Act has basically
become a permanent piece of legislation. Would a permanent preclearance provision,
whereby covered jurisdictions must submit their electoral laws to the Attorney General
in perpetuity, and with a barely existent bailout provision to boot, pass constitutional
muster?
If the federalism revolution has any traction whatsoever, the answer to this question
must be no. Federal statutes can hardly be any more intrusive into areas of state
sovereignty than this one. And so the stage appears to be set for a clash between 1960's
liberalism and the federalism revolution of more recent years. On its face, this appears
to be a clash for the ages, a test of wills between Congress and its vision of good public
policy coming in direct tension with the Court's federalism revolution.
Yet such a collision might not take place after all. As this Article contends, the
constitutionality of the Act of 1965, is really a question about the Court's appetite for
taking on one of the crown jewels of the civil rights movement and a piece of
legislation recently reauthorized by substantial congressional majorities. This is not a
new question by any means; as this Article argues, the question of legislative findings
and judicial deference dates back to the genesis of the Act and the Court's early
decisions on its constitutionality. This relaxed and forgiving posture has held steady
through the years and has not been affected by the recent federalism revolution. On the
strength of this history, this Article concludes that the question for the future is
ultimately a question ofjudicial attitudes and whether the Court can muster the will to
strike down the most effective civil rights statute in history.
219. TUSHNET, supra note 131, at 277 (2005) (emphasis omitted).
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